This book explores the epistemic or knowledge requirement of moral responsibility. Haji argues that an agent can be blamed (or praised) only if the agent harbors a belief that the action in question is wrong (or right or obligatory). Defending the importance of an "authenticity" condition when evaluating moral responsibility, Haji holds that one cannot be morally responsible for an action unless the action issues from sources (like desires or beliefs) that are truly the agent's own. Engaging crucial (...) arguments in moral theory to elaborate his views on moral responsibility, Haji addresses as well fascinating, underexamined topics such as assigning blame across an intercultural gap and the relevance of unconscious or dream thoughts when evaluating responsibility. (shrink)

The role of freedom in assigning moral responsibility is one of the deepest problems in metaphysics and moral theory. _Incompatibilism’s Allure_ provides original analysis of the principal arguments for incompatibilism. Ishtiyaque Haji incisively examines the consequence argument, the direct argument, the deontic argument, the manipulation argument, the impossibility argument and the luck objection. He introduces the most important contemporary discussions in a manner accessible to advanced undergraduates, but also suited to professional philosophers. The result is a unique and compelling (...) account for incompatibilism’s continuing allure. (shrink)

Something is subject to luck if it is beyond our control. In Luck's Mischief, Haji argues that owing frequently to precluding our being able to otherwise, luck limits both the range of what is morally obligatory for us and things for which we are morally responsible.

This book extends our understanding of the nature of moral obligation and moral responsibility by arguing that they are far more similar in pertinent respects than frequently conceived. First, the view that, unlike obligation, responsibility does not require freedom to do otherwise is challenged. Conceptual ties between obligation and responsibility largely speak in favor of responsibility’s requiring alternatives. Second, many philosophers champion responsibility semicompatibilism, the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with (...) responsibility. Essential relations between obligation and responsibility are deployed against this thesis, and the parallel thesis of obligation semicompatibilism is rejected. An upshot of forsaking these species of semicompatibilism is that determinism threatens both obligation and responsibility in virtue of eliminating alternate possibilities. Third, many concur that whereas you may now no longer have an obligation that you previously had, you cannot now fail to be blameworthy for something for which you were formerly to blame. This immutability thesis about blameworthiness is shown to be false, and significant ramifications of its falsity are exposed. Finally, a legitimate difference between obligation and responsibility is uncovered: while how you acquire your values may significantly influence whether you are responsible for much of your conduct, obligation is not “historical” in this way. The impact of these similarities and the one difference on whether obligation is overriding and whether various accounts of practical rationality, love, and punishment are cogent is discussed. (shrink)

To have free will with respect to an act is to have the ability both to perform and to refrain from performing it. In this book, Ishtiyaque Haji argues that no one can have practical reasons of a certain sort - "objective reasons" - to perform some act unless one has free will regarding that act.

Determinism is the thesis that ‘there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.’ When various compatibilists discuss determinism and moral responsibility, they champion the view that although determinism is inconsistent with freedom to do otherwise, it is nevertheless consistent with responsibility. Determinism, then, does not, in the view of these compatibilists, threaten one sort of moral appraisal — the sort we make, for example, when we say that someone is blameworthy for some deed. Call moral deontic normative statuses (...) like those of being morally right, wrong, or obligatory, ‘moral anchors.’ A key objective of this paper is to show that even if compatibilists can secure moral responsibility against the threat of determinism, possibly, by establishing that freedom to do otherwise is not the right sort of freedom required for responsibility, they will not be able to secure the very anchors of morality by any similar line of reasoning. Specifically, I argue that if certain principles of moral obligation are true, nothing can be morally right, wrong, or obligatory in a world in which we lack alternative possibilities. Thus, whereas unfreedom to do otherwise may be compatible with responsibility, it is incompatible with moral anchorage. (shrink)

In this paper, I restrict discussion to cases of psychopathy in which it is assumed that psychopaths who satisfy epistemic requirements of responsibility, including the requirement that one is culpable for an action only if one performs it in light of the belief that one is doing wrong, can and do perform actions they take to be immoral or illegal. I argue that in such cases, the well-documented emotional impairment of psychopaths fails to subvert moral culpability. In particular, it does (...) not undermine the sort of control required for moral blameworthiness and, hence, assuming all other conditions of responsibility have been met, the psychopaths of concern are indeed culpable for their behavior. Drawing, however, from certain lessons regarding the effects of coercion on responsibility, I propose that emotional impairment is a factor that should abate, perhaps even significantly, negative reaction to or treatment of such agents. (shrink)

An overarching aim of education is the promotion of children's personal well-being. Liberal educationalists also support the promotion of children's personal autonomy as a central educational aim. On some views, such as John White's, these two goals—furthering well-being and cultivating autonomy—can come apart. Our primary aim in this paper is to argue for a species of a stronger view: assuming preferentism as our axiology, we suggest that there is an essential association between the autonomy of our springs of action, such (...) as desires and beliefs, on the one hand, and personal well-being, on the other. If we are right about this link, then we have at our disposal a partial (non-instrumental) validation of the liberal ideal of autonomy. (shrink)

Event-causal libertarianism concerning free will faces two challenging problems of control. Indeterminism so diminishes control that it is incompatible with an indeterministically caused act's being free. Since event-causal libertarianism's metaphysical or agency commitments are no richer than those of its best compatibilist rivals, how does event-causal libertarianism secure for libertarian free agents more control than these rivals? I argue that the two problems are inextricably associated in that whether event-causal libertarianism can deliver enhanced control depends upon a solution to problem (...) , but there are formidable hurdles in the way of reaching this solution. (shrink)

Frankfurt examples invite controversy over whether the pertinent agent in these examples lacks the specific ability to do otherwise, and whether what she does can be obligatory or permissible. We develop an account of ability that implies that this agent does not have the specific ability to refrain from performing the germane action. The account also undergirds a view of obligation that entails that it is morally required or prohibited for an agent to perform an action only if she has (...) the specific ability to do, and to do otherwise than, perform it. Therefore, in Frankfurt examples, it is neither obligatory nor impermissible for the relevant agent to do what she does. (shrink)

Publication date: 11 June 2018 Source: Author: Fatemeh Nemati Sogolitappeh, Amjad Hedayat, Mehrdad Rezaee Arjmand, Mohamad Khaledian The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship between spiritual intelligence and emotional intelligence with resilience in undergraduate students. The population of the study included all students of Payam Noor University in Ghorveh during 2016-2017 academic years. According to the principles of statistical methodology for correlational studies, 100 students from different disciplines were selected as sample of the study using (...) simple random sampling method. In this research, King's Spiritual Intelligence Questionnaire, Bar-Ann 90-questions Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire, and Conner and Davison resilience questionnaire were used. Descriptive statistics and inferential statistics were used to analyze the data. The results of this study showed that there is a significant positive correlation between spiritual intelligence and emotional intelligence and resilience. Regression coefficients showed that spiritual intelligence and emotional intelligence predict 53.9% of the variation in resiliency. (shrink)

Moral distress has emerged as a significant concern for critical care nurses, particularly due to the complex and demanding care provided to critically ill patients in critical care units. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has introduced new ethical challenges and changes in clinical practice, further exacerbating the experience of moral distress among these nurses. This systematic review compares the factors influencing moral distress among critical care nurses before and during the COVID-19 pandemic to gain a comprehensive understanding of the impact of (...) the pandemic on moral distress. For this systematic review, PubMed, Scopus, ProQuest, Web of Science, medRxiv, bioRxiv, Embase, and Google Scholar were all utilized in the search. The search covered articles published from 2012 to December 2022, encompassing a 10-year timeframe to capture relevant research on moral distress among critical care nurses. In total, 52 articles were included in this systematic review. The findings indicate that personal, caring-related, and organizational factors can influence nurses' moral distress. Before the pandemic, factors including futile and end-of-life care, conflicts with physicians, nurse performance and authority, poor teamwork, decision-making regarding treatment processes and patient care, limited human resources and equipment, medical errors, patient restraints, and nurses' age and work experience affect critical care nurses' moral distress. Similarly, during the COVID-19 pandemic, factors contributing to moral distress include futile and end-of-life care, fear of contracting and spreading COVID-19, decision-making about treatment processes, poor teamwork, and being female. This study revealed that the factors contributing to moral distress were approximately similar in both periods. Futile care and end-of-life issues were critical care nurses' primary causes of moral distress. Implementing prevention strategies and reducing these underlying factors could decrease this major issue and improve the quality of care. (shrink)

Scenarios featuring surreptitious psychological manipulation are invoked to motivate the view that love is historical in that how one acquires elements deemed essential to love can affect whether one indeed loves another or the value of the sort of love one displays. I argue that love’s historicity helps to unearth its freedom requirements. These requirements render love fragile insofar as lack of free agency compromises love, lovable behavior, or relationships of love.

This book addresses a dilemma concerning freedom and moral obligation (obligation, right and wrong). If determinism is true, then no one has control over one's actions. If indeterminism is true, then no one has control over their actions. But it is morally obligatory, right or wrong for one to perform some action only if one has control over it. Hence, no one ever performs an action that is morally obligatory, right or wrong. The author defends the view that this dilemma (...) can be evaded but not in a way traditional compatibilists about freedom and moral responsibility will find congenial. For moral obligation is indeed incompatible with determinism but not with indeterminism. He concludes with an argument to the effect that, if determinism is true and no action is morally obligatory, right or wrong, then our world would be considerably morally impoverished as several sorts of moral appraisal would be unjustified. (shrink)

Externalism is the view that facts about one's history or past in the external world that bear on the acquisition of one's responsibility-grounding psychological elements are pertinent to whether one's actions are free and, hence, pertinent to whether one can be morally responsible for them. Internalism is the thesis that the conditions of moral responsibility can be specified independently of facts about how the person acquired her responsibility-grounding psychological elements. In this paper we defend a position that navigates between externalism (...) and internalism: moral responsibility does not require that one have a past but it does require that one not have certain kinds of past. (shrink)

The problem of luck is advanced and defended against libertarian theories of responsibility-enabling ability. An outline of an account of ability is articulated to explore some features of the sort of ability moral responsibility requires. The account vindicates the luck objection and suggests a novel puzzle: Libertarianism is structurally barred from answering the problem of luck because responsibility requires, but inherently lacks, an explanation from reason states to actions that preserves reliability of connection between responsibility-grounding reasons-sensitivity and action.

Architecture has a marked influence on ethical perception. Ethical perception, in turn, has a pronounced influence on what we are morally responsible for, our decisions, choices, intentional omissions, and overt actions, for instance. It thus stands to reason that architecture bears saliently on moral responsibility. If we now introduce a widely accepted premise that one of the fundamental aims of education is to see that our children turn into morally responsible agents, we can further infer that architecture has an influence (...) on educating for moral responsibility. Our primary aims in this paper are, first, to uncover associations between architecture and ethical perception, on the one hand, and moral.. (shrink)

Reza Akbari Solving moral conflicts entails a decision-making process. So any suggested approach to moral conflicts is included in the domain of practical rationality. The practical rationality is based on theoretical rationality. Both the theoretical and practical rationality have a realistic kind of approach and an idealistic kind of approach. In the theoretical rationality, the idealistic approaches demand certainty in a strict sense, following epistemic guidelines; and in the practical rationality, they demand the best possible choice. Nevertheless, there are (...) some difficulties with the idealistic approaches. Concerning the realistic approaches, we can gain access to two truths: First, each situation is an individual circumstance and each person has certain epistemic features, and so it is not possible to present general, universalizable solutions to conflicts even in a particular scope. Second, the acceptance of some propositions is a voluntary act, and so cognitive space and previous beliefs of any individual have a role in the acceptance of a belief and the following universalizations. By attention to extensive emphasis of the religion on moral doctrines, it can be said that religious education through practical patterns has a positive role in solving moral conflicts. (shrink)

There is a quotation in the Holly Quran from the book of Psalms in 21:105: “The righteous shall inherit the earth”. A similar sentence can be found in Psalm37:29: צַדִּיקִים יִֽירְשׁוּ־אָרֶץ וְיִשְׁכְּנוּ לָעַד עָלֶֽיהָ. A comparison between these verses would illustrate that “صالح” is the Quranic equivalent of the Hebrew word “צַדִּיקִ”. This equivalence would allow us to compare usages of “صالح” in Quran and “צַדִּיקִ” in the book of Psalms. This comparative study will show that: (a) on the one (...) hand, “צַדִּיקִ” has been used in Psalms either as an attribute of God or as a description of some peoples and on the other, “صالح” has been used in Quran for describing either some peoples or their acts, (b) These two words have similar usages in Psalms and Quran to the extent that they have been used for the description of some peoples and (c) the Quranopsalmic use of this notion can be linked with the concept of “divine selection(istifā)”. (shrink)

BackgroundWhile neighborhood safety and stranger danger have been mostly canonized to play a part in parents’ physical activity avoidance, less is known about the impact of parental stress and perceived risk on children’s PA avoidance and consequently on children’s level of PA and wellbeing. Understanding the contributors to children’s wellbeing during pandemic disease is the first critical step in contributing to children’s health during epidemic diseases.MethodsThis study employed 276 healthy children, aged 10–12 years, and their parents. Data were collected in (...) October and November 2020, about 9 months after the local closing of schools due to the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Parents and children answered a separate set of questions. Besides the demographic information, the parents responded to questions on their stress level, perceived risk of COVID-19, and PA avoidance for children. Children responded to questions on their PA and wellbeing in the last week. Data were analyzed using SmartPLS and IBM SPSS 22.ResultsThe result of the study supported the four directional research hypotheses of the sequential study model. As hypothesized, parents’ stress and perceived risk levels of COVID-19 negatively affected children’s PA. The PA level was shown to predict children’s wellbeing and mental health. Housing type, parents’ job security, number of siblings, number of members living together in-home, and history of death or hospitalization of relatives or family members due to COVID-19 were found to be associated with parents’ stress and children’s mental health.ConclusionThis study sheds light on parents’ role in children’s wellbeing and mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic. Parents with higher stress and high restrictive behaviors might put their children at risk of mental disorders in the end. (shrink)

I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing (...) to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections. (shrink)

There are no moral obligations: either it is determined in advance what we will do, or it is not. But any action not in our control cannot be obligatory for us. Hence, regardless of whether our actions are determined to occur, nothing is obligatory. This conclusion has important implications for conceptions of moral responsibility and free will.

Key elements of Randolph Clarke's libertarian account of freedom that requires both agent-causation and non-deterministic event-causation in the production of free action is assessed with an eye toward determining whether agent-causal accounts can accommodate the truth of judgments of moral obligation.

John Lemos defends an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will that is a variant of event-causal libertarian views. Many argue that these views are susceptible to the luck problem: an agent’s directly free choices are too luck infected for the agent to be morally responsible for them. The weightings model supposedly escapes this problem largely because in this model an agent’s reasons for choices do not come with pre-established values. Rather, an agent performs intentional acts of weighting that contribute (...) to the value she assigns to her reasons. Decisions that are consequences of weightings are, thus, under the agent’s control and not subject to luck. In a recent paper, I argued that despite its weighting component, Lemos’s model succumbs to the luck problem. Lemos rejoins that my criticisms are based on misunderstandings and confusions. I deflect the charge of misperception and explain why the weightings model remains susceptible to the luck problem. (shrink)

Introduction: Maintaining dignity is one of patients is one of the main ethical responsibilities of caregivers. However, in many cases, the dignity of patients, especially autistic teenagers is not maintained. The extent to which dignity needs are met for this group within the Iranian care system is difficult to determine as dignity is an abstract concept, and there are few related research studies reported. Objectives: The objective of this study is to find out caregivers perspectives on dignity in teenagers with (...) autistic spectrum disorder. Research design: This study uses a qualitative research design. The data were collected through individual, semi-structured interviews and field notes developed during the interviews. In order to analyze the data, qualitative conventional content analysis was used. Participants and research context: In all, 16 professional caregivers for autistic teenagers working in public hospitals were recruited based on a targeted sampling method to reach data saturation from February 2016 to July 2017. Findings: The findings of this study were presented in three main themes, “privacy,” “respecting individual identity,” and “comprehensive support,” and 11 categories. Ethical consideration: This study’s protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of medical universities located in Southeast of Iran and the required ethical principles were followed throughout. Discussion and conclusion: Based on the findings of this study from the perspective of caregivers, autistic teenagers need to be cared for and educated in a respectful environment where their privacy is maintained, their individual identities are respected, and they receive comprehensive familial, social, and financial support. These conditions would maintain the dignity of such teenagers and would result in appropriate behavioral outcomes. Therefore, it is suggested that a cultural, professional and institutional background in which all components of the autistic teenager’s dignity are protected and emphasized be provided. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 799-811, August 2022.

(2013). Conversation and responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 267-286.

A commentary on al-Yazdī's gloss on al-Taftāzānī's Tahdhīb al-manṭiq wa-al-kalām; logic, Arabic logic; early works to 1800.

Justification of believe in God had been one of the most challenging problem throughout history of philosophy. The problem is "is believe in god epistemically justified?" Gutting's theory in justification of theism is combined of two parts. He critiques Witgenstainian's view firstly, and then considers Aquinas’, Plantinga's, and some other views as incorrect views on theism. Gutting says that Witgenstainians and Tomistic approaches cannot draw a religious language exactly. He also considers Plantinga's view as an incorrect view, because it is (...) completely possible that the viewpoint of believers in believing to the existence of God to be evaluate epistemological as true as the non-believers’ view to the nonexistence of God. Discussing his own view, Gutting justifies believing in God regarding the religious experience. This article explains Gutting's critique of Witgenstainian's, Thomistic and Planting's approach on justification of believe in God. (shrink)

At the time of his premature death at the age of forty-three, the written output of Ali Shariati was remarkable. He wrote in a variety of styles and forms and read extensively from vastly distinct literary traditions. While in recent years, Anglophone scholarship on his work has situated him rightfully among critical anticolonial thinkers such as Frantz Fanon, his contribution to a worldly reimagining of comparative literature has not received the same attention. This essay offers a framing of his work (...) within the field of comparative literature, with a particular focus on his adaptation of Dante’s Divine Comedy. By studying his mode of engagement with this canonical text, this essay provides an introductory analysis to the comparative literary practice of a towering Iranian intellectual. It can also serve as a model for a comparative literature practicum that privileges the work of a writer from the Global South. (shrink)

Mullā Sadrā appeared in the philosophical field when the prevalent philosophical questions were principality of existence and principality of quiddity. Although he first held the theory of principality of quiddity, later in a cognitional rotation he accepted the theory of principality of existence. Such a rotation gradually causes a wide revolution in the realm of philosophy, and consequently it yields principles such as unity of existence, analogicity of existence, and intensification of existence. He propounds external objectivity of existence, knowledge, beauty (...) and other qualities of perfection as his philosophical principles. Thus, due to Mullā Sadrā’s basic principles, we can attain to principles such as principality of beauty, unity of beauty, analogicity of beauty, and intensification of beauty. (shrink)

"In this article, I will try to examine this doctrine from a historical point of view; this examination is, somehow, different from the critical studies on this doctrine. This doctrine should be discussed as an epistemological topic. Hence, to recognize the notion of intelligence, a glance on the history of development of this term will largely help us.''After a historical discussion from the ancient times to the present time, the author says:"``After the advent of Islam and the conquests, made by (...) Muslims, the scientific heritage of the predecessors became available for Muslim thinkers, and the works of Greek philosophers were translated into Arabic. Among the translated works, those of Aristotle were of special importance, so that the good translators of these works were paid openhandedly. This, perhaps, caused some translators to translate the works of the other philosophers and attribute them to Aristotle, in order to take more money. Among the books, which probably were attributed in this way to Aristotle, was a book translated as ``Athologia''". This book is, in fact, the translation of some part of Plotinus' Enneads. This apparently insignificant mistake left a very great effect on the thoughts of Muslim philosophers. As a result of general acceptance of Aristotle the earlier philosophers on the one hand and attribution of this book to him on the other hand, Plotinus' ideas entered the Islamic philosophy under Aristotle's name, and caused the Peripatetic philosophy of Muslim philosophers to appear in the guise of Neo-Platonism. After Introducing Ibn Sina's perspective as well as that of Mulla Sadra on the doctrine of unity of the intellect and intelligible, I will note some 7 fundamental flaws in Mulla Sadra's doctrine.". (shrink)

This Handbook addresses Chaucer's poetry in the context of several disciplines, including late medieval philosophy and science, Mediterranean culture, comparative European literature, vernacular theology, and popular devotion.

Conflicts over rangeland exploitation have been a serious challenge in Iran, rooted in human behavior. Accordingly, this study aimed to provide a comprehensive theoretical framework in the field of analyzing conflict behavior among rangeland exploiters. This research is a descriptive-correlational and causal-relational study conducted using a cross-sectional survey. The statistical population of the study was rangeland exploiters in one of the northwest provinces of Iran (N= 66,867) of whom 384 people were selected as a sample and stratified random sampling method (...) with proportional assignment. The research instrument was a questionnaire, the validity of which was confirmed by a panel of academic experts and the reliability of its items was verified using Cronbach’s alpha coefficient. The results showed that the variables of personal norms (PN) and the perceived behavioral control were able to predict 25.9% of the variance in terms of the conflicting behavior of rangeland exploiters; besides, ascription of responsibility, PN, perceived behavioral control, and awareness of consequences, which have been proposed as activators of PN, were able to explain a significant percentage (63.5%) of the variance in terms of PN. Furthermore, analysis of the effects of environmental and cultural values showed that conflict behaviors of exploiters were mostly affected by their underlying values. Generally, the results of this study would help in the development of more integrated and comprehensive models in the field of exploiters’ conflict behavior. Eventually, to change and improve the environmental behavior of exploiters to better management of conflict in rangelands, providing a list of considerations and competencies for agricultural extension and education, this article comes to the end. (shrink)

According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, (...) or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection. (shrink)

Whether indeterminism undermines moral responsibility by subverting one or more of responsibility’s requirements is something that has received close attention in the recent literature on free will. In this paper, I take issue with Gerald Harrison’s attempt to deflect various considerations for the view that indeterminism threatens responsibility either by threatening the control that responsibility requires or by posing a problem of luck.

In Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility, Alfred Mele invokes radical reversal cases in which one agent is covertly manipulated to be just like another agent in relevant respects to defend a version of the following “externalist” thesis: how agents acquire their springs of action, such as desires and beliefs, bears on whether they are morally responsible for their actions. I assess proposed rationales for the crucial verdict that agents in such cases are not responsible for their germane actions. (...) I argue for the superiority of Mele’s rationale and propose that these cases also support accepting an externalist constraint on other normative appraisals, such as those of practical rationality. Key words: Moral obligation; practical rationality; radical reversal cases; ultimate origination; zygote argument. (shrink)

This study was administrated to undergraduate students living in the various hostels of Universiti Sains Malaysia. The primary purpose of this study was to identify the most important factors that predict undergraduate students’ level of satisfaction with the student hostels they are living in. This paper also explored the difference in the satisfaction levels of students living in hostels within the campus and those living in hostels outside the campus. Based on literature review, it was hypothesized that there would be (...) a difference in the satisfaction level between these two groups of hostel residents due to the different characteristics that these hostels have. Additionally, this study investigated the most preferred hostels among students and identified the reasons for the preference. A sample population of 288 students (220 females; and 68 males) was involved in this study with 48.3% living in hostels inside the campus and 51.7% living in hostels located outside the main campus area. The result of the study suggests that satisfaction with fees, distance from university facilities, room safety, room size, hostel security, and hostel facilities are the most important factors which predict undergraduate students’ satisfaction with their hostel. There was also a significant difference in the satisfaction level between inside-campus and outside-campus hostels students. The most important factors that influenced that students satisfaction levels were distance from the university facilities, the exterior condition of the hostel, hostel population, satisfaction with transport, hostel security, room size, and room safety. The study also found that the most preferred hostel among the students was Cahaya Gemilang due to its strategic location, close distance to lecture halls and other main facilities in the campus and, good internet network connection. Keywords: satisfaction, hostels, predicting factors, undergraduate students. (shrink)